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Abstract 
The self-concept is dynamic, with momentary definition shifting from a representation of self as 
a unique and independent social agent to an undifferentiated and interchangeable group member. 
Indeed, the individual self and collective self are fundamental components of the self-concept, 
with each being important and meaningful to human experience. However, are those selves 
equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research empirically testing three 
competing hypotheses which suggests that the motivational core of human experience is (a) the 
individual self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual factors that make a given 
self momentarily accessible. The research furnished unanimous and consistent evidence that the 
individual self is the motivationally primary form of self-definition. 
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The shot is up…its good! The fans are ecstatic with chants of ‘We’re number one!’ 
  The elation that engulfs fans following victory as well as the dejection that follows defeat 
might seem bizarre or puzzling to a naïve observer. Fans are not members of the teams. They are 
not competitors in the game. Yet, they respond as if their psychological welfare is on the line. 
From a fan’s perspective, however, the fan is more than a spectator and is subjectively part of the 
team. More precisely, the team is a part of the fan. Fans internalize the team into their self-
concept and define themselves in terms of the team (Branscombe & Wann, 1991; Dietz-Uhler & 
Murrel, 1999). In other words, the team becomes a part of the fan’s group-based social identity. 
Indeed, chants and cheers attest to the team-based sense of self such as when fans refer to the 
team with the personal pronoun “we,” as in “we won” or “we’re number one” (Cialdini et al., 
1976). Because the team provides a basis of self-definition, victory or loss for the team is 
experienced by the fan as victory or loss for the self. 
  As the latter example demonstrates, an internalized group identity is a powerful motivator 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). But, are all self-definitions equivalent motivators? The current article 
examines the relative motivational potency of two fundamental forms of self-definition: 
individual and collective. The individual self is a representation of self as a unique and 
independent social agent. It consists of traits, characteristics, experiences, interests, and goals 
that promote a sense of distinctiveness and individuality. The collective self is a representation of 
self as an undifferentiated and interchangeable group member (e.g. as when fans paint 
themselves in their team’s colors). It consists of traits, characteristics, experiences, interests, and 
goals derived from shared group memberships that promote a sense of assimilation and 
connection. The two forms of self coexist such that persons can alternate between perceiving the 
self as a distinct individual versus an interchangeable group member (Sedikides & Brewer, On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  4 
2001). Likewise, both forms of self contribute to human experience by influencing thought, 
feeling, and action (Hawkley, Browne, & Cacioppo, 2005; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987).  
  The psychological literature, however, is ambiguous as to whether those selves contribute 
equally to human experience. It is possible, for example, to delve into the literature and discover 
reasons to argue that the motivational core of the self-concept is (a) the individual self, (b) the 
collective self, or (c) a fluctuating consequence of the social context. To bring clarity to the 
issue, we begin the article with a brief overview of the latter three arguments or hypotheses for 
motivational primacy and the evidence supporting the plausibility of each. We then examine a 
program of research designed to test directly the hypotheses, with the goal of determining which 
hypothesis best accounts for motivational primacy in self-definition. 
Three Hypotheses of Motivational Primacy 
Individual-self primacy hypothesis 
  According to the individual-self primacy hypothesis, the individual self is the 
motivational core of human experience. Supporting this hypothesis is research that attests to the 
stability of the individual self (Greenwald, 1980; Pelham, 1991). The individual self consists of 
core attributes that are held with high certainty and regarded subjectively as important (i.e. self-
schemas). Such schemas guide the processing of self-relevant information (Markus, 1977), 
incorporate positively affirming information (Sedikides, 1993), seek information that confirms 
those core attributes (Swann, 1990) and, thereby, render a stable self that is resistant to both 
external (Markus, 1997) and internal (Sedikides, 1995) influences. Further supporting this 
hypothesis is research that attests to the strong motivation to maintain and enhance a favorable 
self-view and protect against threats to that favorable self-view (Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides, On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  5 
Gaertner, & Vevea 2005; Sedikides & Green, 2000; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Persons, for 
example, perceive themselves to be better than the average other (Alicke & Govorun, 2005) and 
seize individual credit for a group’s success while denying blame for the group’s failure (Mullen 
& Riordan, 1988; Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977). Similarly, persons protect themselves against 
threats to a favorable self-view with various strategies such as selectively avoiding contexts that 
highlight critical self-flaws in favor of contexts that highlight self-superiority (Sedikides, 1993), 
prospectively behaving in ways that provide alternative explanations for an impending failure 
(e.g. “I failed because I didn’t sleep enough, otherwise I would have aced the test”; Jones & 
Berglas, 1978), and reinterpreting threatening information in a manner that de-emphasizes the 
threat (e.g., “the test is bogus and does not assess my ability”; Kunda, 1990). If threats elude the 
protective strategies and penetrate the self-system, further erosion of a favorable self-view is 
protected against by devaluing the dimension on which the self is threatened (e.g., “I don’t care 
about math!”; Steele, 1997) or escaping self-awareness (e.g., excessive drinking, zoning out with 
television; Baumeister, 1991; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Indeed, 
maintaining a favorable individual self is positively associated with mental and physical health 
(Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, in press; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003a, 
b). Finally, support for the individual-self primacy hypothesis is provided by theories of 
evolution that focus on the individual as the unit of selection. Classic perspectives suggest that 
natural selection acts on the individuals rather than the group of a given species (Dawkins & 
Krebs, 1978; Wallace, 1973). Moreover, the individual-self is argued to be an adaptive human 
trait that provided evolving hominids with advantageous solutions to both ecological and social 
selection pressures (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000, 2003; Sedikides, Skowronski, & Gaertner, 
2004). In summary, the literatures on self-stability, self-enhancement/self-protection, and the On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  6 
individual in evolution offer support consistent with the possibility that the motivational center 
of the self-concept is the individual self. 
Collective-self primacy hypothesis 
  According to the collective-self primacy hypothesis, the collective self is the motivational 
core of human experience. Support for this hypothesis is provided by research that attests to the 
impact social groups exert on their members. Persons, for example, alter their opinions in 
response to their group’s majority (Asch, 1951) and, at times, minority (Moscovici, 1976), 
polarize their beliefs in the direction of the group’s tendency (Myers & Lamm, 1976; Stoner, 
1968), and naturally coordinate and distribute information with ingroup members (Liang, 
Moreland, & Argote, 1995). Support for this hypothesis is also provided by the motivation to 
protect and enhance a positive collective self-view in that persons routinely evidence favorable 
actions, beliefs, and attitudes toward groups in which they are members (Boldry & Gaertner, 
2006; Brewer 1979). Support is also provided by theories of natural selection that emphasize 
social groups. Theories of group-level selection, for example, suggest that natural selection, at 
times, operates on the group of a given species (Bulmer, 1978, Wilson & Sober, 1994). Other 
perspectives view the group not as a target of selection but as an environment for selection 
(Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Caporael, 2007; Stevens & Fiske, 1995). Such perspectives suggest 
that hominids who better solved the problems uniquely exerted by the dynamics of group life 
(e.g. problems of coordination, communication, and sharing) were more apt to survive and 
transmit their genes into subsequent generations; the dynamics of group life thereby shaped 
current human functioning. Finally, Optimal Distinctiveness theory offers conceptual support for 
this hypothesis with the assertion that, unlike the individual self, the collective self provides the 
optimal level of self-definition by simultaneously satisfying competing needs for assimilation On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  7 
and differentiation via intergroup and intragroup comparisons, respectively (Brewer, 1991; 
Brewer & Roccas, 2001). In summary, the literatures on the impact of groups on individuals, 
enhancement of ingroups, groups in evolution, and Optimal Distinctiveness theory offer support 
consistent with the possibility that the motivational center of the self-concept is the collective 
self. 
Contextual primacy hypothesis 
  According to the contextual primacy hypothesis, neither self is inherently the 
motivational core of the self concept, because motivational primacy varies as a function of 
contextual factors that affect the momentary accessibility of the selves. The self that is 
momentarily more accessible serves as the motivational core. This hypothesis is supported by 
theoretical perspectives that emphasize the context dependent nature of self-functioning. For 
example, the concept of the working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 
1987) suggests that self-functioning is influenced by the particular subset of self-aspects that are 
currently accessible, with accessibility being affected by both chronic activation and contextual 
cues. Similarly, self-categorization theory (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) suggests that self-definition fluctuates between the individual 
and collective self as a function of contextual features, with the collective self becoming salient 
in intergroup contexts and the individual self becoming salient in intragroup contexts. In 
summary, the literatures on the contextual malleability of the self-concept offer support 
consistent with the possibility that the motivational center of the self-concept is the momentarily 
accessible self. 
Empirically Testing the Motivational Primacy Hypotheses On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  8 
  Given the plausibility of all three hypotheses and the possibility of selectively referencing 
evidence ostensibly consistent with each hypothesis, the self literature, it seems, is at an impasse.  
To resolve the issue, we have been engaged in a program of research designed to compare the 
hypotheses and determine empirically which is most tractable. We utilize the strong motivational 
tendency of protecting and enhancing a favorable sense of self as a metaphorical microscope or 
medium in which we empirically differentiate the motivational primacy hypotheses. The research 
compares the relative functioning of the selves in the face of threat or enhancement with the 
rationale that the self that serves as the motivational core of human experience will react more 
strongly to events that compromise, on the one hand, and bolster, on the other hand, that self’s 
integrity. In other words, the motivationally primary self is the self that more strongly rejects and 
evades threat and more strongly accepts and approaches enhancement. 
  Of course, with an issue as broad as that of motivational primacy, no single study can 
contain and control all of the methodological considerations necessary for effectively and 
diagnostically testing the hypotheses. Consequently, we have cast a broad net by conducting 
multiple studies, each with its own methodological nuances. We enacted careful control over 
variables that could corrupt comparative test of the hypotheses. Across the studies, for example, 
we enacted different procedures for controlling the accessibility of the selves, employed various 
forms of threat or enhancement, assessed a variety of reactions to threat and enhancement, 
sampled an assortment of group identities that represent the collective self, and were particularly 
careful to differentiate and assess the independent reaction of each self. Across those diverse 
procedures and controls, each study yielded consistent and unanimous support for the same 
hypothesis: the individual-self primacy hypothesis. What follows are representative examples of 
our research program.  On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  9 
A test with simultaneous accessibility of the selves 
  In an initial study (Gaertner, Sedikides, Graetz, 1999, Experiment 1), female college 
students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) completed a (bogus) 
personality test (i.e. The Berkeley Personality Inventory; BPI) under the guise that the 
Psychology Department was gathering data on the characteristics of female students for the 
(fabricated) Office of Student Affairs. We crafted the introductory materials so as to make 
accessible both the individual self and the collective self, which, in this instance, was based on 
the group “women.” Instructions, for example, cued the individual self by reminding participants 
that the student body “is extremely diverse; after all, each one of you is an individual with your 
own unique background, personality traits, skills, abilities, and hobbies.” Subsequent instructions 
similarly cued the collective self, “you also share membership with other students in various 
social groups. Previous research has indicated that one of the most important social groups to 
which people belong is gender. That is, you are female and you share membership in the social 
group UNC women.” Participants then completed the computerized BPI, which consisted of 60 
items vaguely related to emotion. 
  The computer ostensibly scored the BPI and provided participants with either enhancing 
or threatening feedback about either their individual or collective self. Pilot testing ensured that 
the feedback referred to a positive or negative trait that was stereotypic of women. In particular, 
participants received either information describing what it means to be “emotionally expressive” 
and why it is good to be emotionally expressive or information describing what it means to be 
“moody” and why it is bad to be moody. Participants receiving individual-self feedback were 
informed, “The BPI indicates that participant #353191 is” either “very emotionally expressive” 
or “excessively moody.” Participants receiving collective-self feedback were informed that On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  10 
feedback was not permitted to be personalized and could be provided only in aggregate form 
such that, “the responses of UNC-CH women tested so far (more than 1,500) have been pooled 
together…Please note that your score is NOT yet included in the women’s average score…The 
BPI indicates that UNC women are” either “very emotionally expressive” or “excessively 
moody.”   
  We subsequently assessed the extent to which participants momentarily defined 
themselves in regard to their individual versus collective self. We reasoned that participants 
could buffer themselves from the threatening feedback by strategically shifting away (i.e. 
escaping) from the threatened self. Importantly, however, each of the motivational-primacy 
hypotheses predicted a different pattern of such strategic self-shifting. The individual-self 
primacy hypothesis predicted that negative feedback to the individual self would be more 
threatening than negative feedback to the collective self and, therefore, persons would be more 
likely to shift to the collective self to buffer a threat to the individual self than to shift to the 
individual self to buffer a threat to the collective self. The collective self-primacy hypothesis, on 
the other hand, predicted that negative feedback to the collective self would be more threatening 
than negative feedback to the individual self and, therefore persons would be more likely to shift 
to the individual self to buffer a threat to the collective self than to shift to the collective self to 
buffer a threat to the individual self. The contextual primacy hypothesis predicted yet a third 
results pattern. When both selves are made accessible, negative feedback to the individual self 
will be as threatening as it will be to the collective self and, therefore, persons will be equally 
likely to shift to the collective self when the individual self is threatened and to shift to the 
individual self when the collective self is threatened.  On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  11 
  The results were consistent only with the possibility of individual-self primacy. 
Participants differentially self-defined in the face of positive versus negative feedback to their 
individual self, but not in the face of such feedback to the collective self. In particular, 
participants more strongly deemphasized their uniqueness and increased identification with the 
group women when they received negative than positive information about their individual self. 
However, participants did not manifest analogous changes in uniqueness and identification in 
response to negative versus positive feedback about their collective self. Furthermore, 
participants considered the negative feedback to be less favorable and the positive feedback to be 
more favorable, when it was directed to their individual than collective self. Such results are 
consistent with the idea that the motivational core of the self-concept is the individual self.  
  Of course studies, have their limitations and any single study cannot provide a confident 
basis on which to make strong conclusions. The current study, for example, has two possible 
limitations. First, persons vary in the extent to which they identify with a given group (e.g. 
“women”) and research suggests that group-level threats exert more impact on persons who 
strongly identify with the group (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doojse, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; 
Spears, Doojse, & Ellemers, 1997). Indeed, level of identification is directly relevant to the 
collective-primacy hypothesis such that high group identifiers might evidence collective-self 
primacy, while low group identifiers might evidence individual-self primacy. Unfortunately, we 
did not assess pre-feedback levels of identification, and it is possible that the majority of 
participants identified only weakly with the group women. Second, we controlled the nature of 
the feedback by providing each self with the same information (i.e. “very emotionally 
expressive” or “excessively moody”). Perhaps the feedback was more important to the individual On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  12 
self than the collective self and thus yielded reactions consistent with individual-self primacy. On 
the other hand, the feedback was pilot tested to be stereotypic of the group women.  
A test with low and high group identifiers 
  To address the latter concerns, we conducted another study, in which we measured level 
of identification and the importance of the dimension of threat before supplying participants with 
negative feedback (Gaertner et al., 1999, Experiment 2). Male and female students at UNC-CH 
participated in a study ostensibly concerned with creativity. Participants first completed a 
measure of the extent to which they identified with UNC-CH (i.e. the group which would 
represent the collective self) and, depending on which self the negative feedback would be 
directed, rated how important creativity is to them personally (individual self) or to UNC-CH 
students (collective self). Participants subsequently completed a bogus, but face valid, creativity 
test and received feedback about their performance.  
  Participants who received a threat to the individual self were informed that they “scored 
at the 31
st percentile. This means that your score is worse than 69% of the creativity scores in the 
normative reference sample.” Participants who received a threat to the collective self were 
informed that feedback could be provided only in terms of the average creativity score of UNC 
students to which their own score had not yet been added such that UNC “scored at the 31
st 
percentile. This means that UNC’s score is worse than 69% of the creativity scores in the 
normative reference sample.” Feedback was accompanied by a histogram displaying either the 
participant’s personal performance or UNC’s performance within the normative sample.  
  Participants subsequently rated their current feelings (e.g. angry, sad) and, depending on 
which self the negative feedback was directed, indicated how important the outcome of the test 
was for them personally (individual self) or UNC-CH (collective self). We reasoned that On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  13 
threatening feedback would elicit a negative mood and a potential strategy for coping with the 
threat would be to derogate the importance of the threat dimension (e.g. “creativity isn’t very 
important;” Wyer & Frey, 1983). Interestingly, the motivational primacy hypotheses offered 
different predictions regarding the patterns of mood and feedback derogation. The individual-self 
primacy hypothesis predicts that negative mood and feedback derogation will be stronger 
following threat to the individual self than threat to the collective self regardless of level of group 
identification. The collective-self primacy hypothesis predicts that negative mood and feedback 
derogation will be stronger following threat to the collective self than threat to the individual self 
regardless of level of group identification. The contextual primacy hypothesis predicts that 
patterns of mood and feedback derogation following threat will vary as a function of group 
identification, such that low group identifiers will show a pattern of individual-self primacy and 
high identifiers will show a pattern of collective-self primacy.  
  Because the pre-feedback importance rating indicated that creativity initially was more 
important to the individual than collective self, we statistically controlled the pre-feedback 
importance rating to prevent confounding the relative importance of the threat with the target of 
threat (individual vs. collective self). So, which hypothesis best accounted for the observed data? 
The data unanimously supported the individual-self primacy hypothesis. Regardless of level of 
group identification, participants experienced a more negative mood and more strongly 
derogated the feedback (i.e. rated creativity as being less important), when the threatening 
feedback was directed at their individual self. As in the previous study, threat to the individual 
self elicited a stronger reaction than did threat to the collective self. 
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  Despite the consistent results across studies, a skeptic could argue that the obtained 
results are a function of methods common to the latter studies. Both studies, for example, used a 
nomothetic procedure of forcing participants to consider the same social group as the basis of the 
collective self. We did, however, vary the particular group across studies (i.e. women in 
Experiment 1 and UNC-CH in Experiment 2) and controlled for idiographic identification in the 
second study. Nonetheless, perhaps the results are somehow limited to those particular groups or 
the procedure of assigning a group to participants. Likewise, both studies examined reactions 
after the selves experienced threat. Perhaps different results would occur, if we observed the 
functioning of the selves before receiving a threat. To address these possibilities we conducted 
another study (O’Mara, Gaertner, & Wayment, 2007), in which we (a) employed an idiographic 
procedure that allowed participants to choose their own group (as a strong test, participants 
selected their most important group) and (b) examined whether the individual versus collective 
self differentially approaches a threat. 
  Male and female students at the University of Tennessee began the study writing a brief 
narrative about either their individual self or collective self. Instructions for the individual-self 
narrative asked participants to describe what makes them a unique person. Instructions for the 
collective-self narrative asked participants to think about the most important social group to 
which they belong and describe that most important group. Following the narrative, participants 
read a story ostensibly written by a recent college graduate who was facing difficulties finding 
employment and happiness (from Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002): 
. . . I tried to get a job, but it’s harder than I expected. I haven’t been able to find a 
good job. I have spent a lot of time working in fast food places, and doing some 
pretty boring stuff. I really expected that things would get easier after I graduated, On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  15 
but people are right when they say it’s tough out there. Right now I’m pretty 
down about things. I’m not sure where I’m going to go from here – I can’t afford 
to go back to school, but I also can’t find a good job . . . this is not where I 
expected to be at this point in my life! 
To examine whether the selves differentially approach a potential threat, we asked participants to 
consider the latter negative experience in terms of the self about which they previously wrote a 
narrative. Participants who completed the individual-self narrative were instructed to “describe 
what you think could cause you to have a negative experience…similar to the student you just 
read about.” Participants who completed the collective-self narrative were instructed to “describe 
what you think could cause a member of your most important group (other than you) to have a 
negative experience…similar to the student you just read about.” Two judges independently 
coded participants’ written responses for whether they genuinely considered how the negative 
events could befall the targeted self. Inter-judge agreement was acceptable with judges agreeing 
on 91.5% of participants’ responses for a kappa of 0.76. The judges subsequently discussed to 
consensus the few disagreements.  
  Our rationale was that the potential threat of future negative events could be avoided, in 
part, by ignoring the events and not adhering to the request of describing how such negativity 
could occur. That is, participants could evidence an unwillingness to face future threat and write 
a response that is off topic. Importantly, the motivational primacy hypotheses predicted different 
patterns of willingness to face future threat. The individual-self primacy hypothesis predicted that 
future negative events would be more threatening for the individual self than the collective self 
and, therefore, participants would be less willing to face future threat to the individual self. The 
collective-self primacy hypothesis predicted that future negative events would be more On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  16 
threatening for the collective self than the individual self and, therefore, participants would be 
less willing to face future threat to the collective self. The contextual primacy hypothesis 
predicted that in this instance when participants are considering their most important social 
group or their individual self, negative future events will be equally threatening to both selves 
and, therefore, participants will be equally unwilling to face a future threat to either self. 
  Conceptually replicating results from our other studies, the data were consistent only with 
the individual-self primacy hypothesis. Where as an overwhelming number of participants (93%) 
were willing to write about how a future negative event could befall another member of their 
most important group, far fewer participants (60%) were willing to write about how the same 
future negative event could befall them personally. Persons are less willing to face a threat to 
their individual self than their collective self. 
  In summary, we have thus far overviewed a sample of the methodologically diverse 
studies in our program of research on motivational primacy. We enacted particular care to 
control and capture factors that could potentially yield misleading conclusions. Our research, for 
example, has (a) integrated various aspects of threat such as varying the nature of the threat (e.g. 
received vs. future), controlling the dimension of feedback, controlling the relative importance of 
the feedback, (b) assessed a variety of reactions such as strategic self-shifting, mood state, 
feedback derogation, anger (Gaertner et al., 1999, Investigation 3), (un)willingness to face a 
future threat, (c) explored variations in self accessibility such as simultaneously activating the 
selves, differentiating between high and low group identifiers, maximizing accessibility of one 
self while minimizing the accessibility of the other (e.g. Gaertner et al., 1999, Investigation 3), 
(d) employed a variety of groups to represent the collective self such as groups that are ascribed 
(e.g. gender), achieved (e.g. university affiliation), context dependent (e.g. Gaertner et al., 1999, On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  17 
Investigation 3), and idiographically designated as most important (for similar procedures see 
Gaertner, Sedikides, Luke, & Iuzzini, 2008), and (e) carefully threatened the selves 
independently and assessed their independent responses. Most dramatic is that, across all of the 
studies and all of the controls, the results have consistently and unanimously demonstrated the 
relative motivational primacy of the individual vs. collective self. Of course, the possibility 
remains that such a finding is somehow limited to the particular (though diverse) procedures 
employed. One way to address this criticism is to continue with an endless array of studies 
substituting various procedures, threats, or groups. We opted instead for a more plausible 
(though conceptually similar) approach: a random effects meta-analysis. 
A meta-analytic test 
  A meta-analysis aggregates results from numerous studies and enables hypothesis testing 
based on a large and diverse body of observed data. When coupled with a random-effects 
statistical model, the meta-analysis directly tests whether the results generalize beyond the 
observed data to a population of possible studies that differ in specific characteristics and 
procedures (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). In addition to extending our research by meta-analytically 
testing the relative reactions of the selves to threat, we also extended our research into the 
domain of enhancement. We searched the extant literature and located 16 studies that compared 
the relative reaction of the individual and collective self to threat and 21 studies that compared 
the relative reaction of the individual and collective self to enhancement. Those 37 studies 
satisfied the necessary inclusion criteria that a given study (a) separately threaten (or enhance) 
the selves, which enables an independent assessment of the reaction of each self, and (b) threaten 
(or enhance) the selves on comparable dimensions, which prevents confounding the target of 
threat or enhancement (individual vs. collective self) with the dimension of threat or On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  18 
enhancement. The included studies varied in terms of the threat or enhancement employed, the 
types of reactions assessed, and the particular groups that represented the collective self. 
  To account for the possible context-dependent nature of motivational primacy, we coded 
studies in regard to two contextual variables. Studies varied in whether participants were low 
versus high group identifiers. A given group is a more accessible basis of the collective self for 
high than low identifiers (e.g. Abrams, 1994; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Spears et al., 1997), 
which renders group identification relevant to the contextual primacy hypothesis. Studies also 
varied in whether the group on which the collective self was based was a laboratory-formed 
group or a pre-existing natural group. Such groups differ in several respects (e.g. member 
commitment and investment; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992) that result in natural groups being a 
more accessible basis of collective self and therefore more relevant to the contextual primacy 
hypothesis.  
  The motivational primacy hypotheses offer different predictions for the meta-analytic 
patterns. The individual-self primacy hypothesis predicts that persons react more strongly to both 
threat and enhancement of the individual self than of the collective self. The collective-self 
primacy hypothesis predicts that persons react more strongly to both threat and enhancement of 
the collective self than of the individual self. The contextual-primacy hypothesis predicts that the 
latter patterns vary as a function group identification and type of group such that low identifiers 
and studies using laboratory groups will show patterns of individual-self primacy and high 
identifiers, whereas studies using natural groups will show patterns of collective-self primacy. 
  Patterns of response under conditions of threat and enhancement were consistent with 
only the individual-self primacy hypothesis. Participants responded approximately 0.5 standard 
deviations more strongly when their individual self was threatened than when their collective self On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  19 
was threatened. Similarly, they responded approximately 0.4 standard deviations more strongly 
when their individual self was enhanced than when their collective self was enhanced. Those 
patterns occurred for both low and high group identifiers and for both laboratory and natural 
groups. Importantly, the random effects procedures enable greater confidence that the patterns 
are not limited to the varieties of threats, enhancements, reactions, and groups employed in the 
analyzed studies and generalize to a larger pool of possible threats, enhancements, reactions, and 
groups.  
Alternative Explanations and Possible Conditions of Collective-Self Primacy 
  We suggest that our research program demonstrates a fundamental social-psychological 
phenomenon: the motivational primacy of the individual self. Of course, we neither cavalierly 
offer such a suggestion nor did we rush to such a conclusion. We sought alternative explanations 
for our findings as well as evidence in favor of the collective-self and contextual-primacy 
hypotheses. Yet, the consistent pattern of results across an array of diverse procedures 
emphasizes the possibility that the individual self is the motivational center of the self-system. 
  Let us briefly reconsider some of these alternatives. Perhaps the relatively stronger 
reaction of the individual self is a product of the particular social groups that we employed to 
represent the collective self. However, we found the same pattern re-occurring across a variety of 
groups, such as achieved groups (e.g. university affiliation; Gaertner et al, 1999, Investigation 2), 
ascribed groups (e.g. gender; Gaertner et al, 1999, Investigation 1), and context-dependent 
groups (e.g. laboratory formed groups; Gaertner et al, 1999, Investigation 3). Indeed, we 
obtained the same pattern with an idiographic procedure in which participants idiosyncratically 
represented their collective self with the ingroup that they subjectively deemed to be most 
important (O’Mara et al, 2007).  On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  20 
  Perhaps our results are a non-motivational consequence of an inadvertent mismatch in the 
operationalized level of specificity between the individual and collective self. Klar and 
colleagues (Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi, 1997; Giladi & Klar, 2002), for example, demonstrated 
that singular targets (e.g. any specific member of a group) are judged more extremely than 
generalized targets (e.g. the average representation of the group as a whole). According to such 
an account, the individual self was operationalized as a singular target and the collective self was 
operationalized with reference to a generalized target in the form of an ingroup. However, the 
same pattern occurs even when the collective self is operationalized as a singular target (e.g. 
contemplating how negative events might befall a specific member of one’s most important 
ingroup; O’Mara et al., 2007). Furthermore, the singular versus generalized mechanism involves 
a comparative judgment such that the singular target is judged directly in comparison with the 
generalized target. The majority of our studies involved between-subject designs (i.e. participants 
experienced threat or enhancement of one self but not of the other self) which minimizes the 
likelihood that reactions of one self were formed in contemplation of and comparison with a 
reaction of the other self.  
  Perhaps the results are somehow a function of a diminished impact of threat or 
enhancement to the collective self, because such threats and enhancements are diffused across 
multiple group members (Latané, 1981). However, the same pattern is obtained across ingroups 
that range in size from large groups with countless members (e.g., women; Gaertner et al., 1999, 
Investigation 1) to small-face-to-face 3-person groups (Gaertner et al., 1999, Investigation 3). 
Indeed, as mentioned previously, the same effect occurs even when the collective self is 
represented in terms of a single ingroup member (O’Mara et al., 2007). On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  21 
  Finally, perhaps our findings are unique to Western cultures (e.g., US, Northern Europe), 
which emphasize the independence and uniqueness of persons; and possibly our findings would 
reverse, evidencing collective-self primacy in Eastern cultures (e.g., China, India, Japan), which 
emphasize the interdependence and connectedness of persons (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
However, in contrast to such a cultural-self perspective, recent research has revealed the strong 
presence of the individual self even in Eastern cultures (Brown, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & 
Vevea, 2005, 2007ab; Gaertner et al., in press; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Indeed, direct 
comparisons suggest a stronger pancultural presence of the individual-self than collective-self. 
On self-description tasks, for example, people provide a greater preponderance of individual-self 
aspects than collective-self aspects. Importantly, that pattern is obtained both among persons 
with an independent self-construal that is characteristic of Western cultures and among persons 
with an interdependent self-construal that is characteristic of Eastern cultures (Gaertner et al., 
1999, Investigation 4). Furthermore, that pattern replicates across comparisons of Chinese versus 
American students and across experimental priming of the individual versus collective self 
(Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).  
Conclusion 
  The individual and collective self are both fundamental forms of self-definition that 
contribute to human experience. As our research demonstrates, however, those forms of self do 
not contribute equally. The motivational structure of the self-concept is arrayed hierarchically 
and the individual self has a motivational status elevated above that of the collective self. 
Metaphorically speaking, screams are more anguished and smiles are more joyous in response to 
events that involve the individual self. Our findings have implications for theory-building. In 
particular, they suggest that theories on the relation between self and social perception will do On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  22 
well to base their premises and hypotheses predominantly on the individual self. The individual 
self, it appears, sits closer to the motivational core of being human.  On The Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self  23 
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